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Approved For Release 2003/08/25 : CIA-RDP61S00750A000400050003-8

ANNEX C

Aug 18, 1956

REPORT ON CIA RESPONSIBILITIES
FOR
IMPLEMENTATION OF REPORT OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES PANEL
(Pursuant to NSC Action No. 1430-n.)

NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED

NSC Action No. 1430-g: "Examination of Peripheral
War Problem: With respect to General Recommendation
11:

(1) Noted that the proposal for a study of
techniques and weapons technology for peripheral
wars is being implemented through a study by the
Weapons Systems Evaluation Group and through a
study under a CIA contract."

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Status: CIA contract relevant to this problem with

completed in early 1957. Consultations have been held
between the [redacted] and between the [redacted]
in matters which have a bearing on [redacted].

NSC

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NSC

Specific Recommendation C.3:

The report on the implementation of this recommend-
ation is omitted from this document for security
reasons.

Specific Recommendation C.4:

"We need to examine intelligence data more broadly,
or to invent some new technique, for the discovery
of hoaxes. As a first step, we recommend a
National Intelligence Estimate, with adequate
safeguards, of our success in keeping secret our
most useful techniques of intelligence. This
estimate would suggest the extent to which an enemy
might be manipulating the information obtained
through these sources."

Status: The Intelligence Advisory Committee initiated
a special National Intelligence Estimate to meet this
recommendation. A pilot project to examine the question of
intelligence on Soviet heavy bombers has been initiated.
Work is being coordinated through the IAC.

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"The growing principles and technology of information retrieval will advance and may revolutionize the handling of large masses of intelligence data. Their application should be sought out more actively."

NSC
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Status: Active search for new equipment and techniques for the handling of large masses of intelligence data has been a preoccupation of CIA since its establishment. In May 1955 the IAC established a sub-committee to "coordinate the development and implementation of compatible systems of documentation and processing of information within the intelligence community." In addition to regular IAC members, NSA and USIA are also represented. A working group on equipment research composed of specialists in research and development has been established to insure that all agencies of the intelligence community are made aware of new equipment which may be of value and that the possibilities of each new technical advance are thoroughly explored on behalf of the community.

Efforts at the moment are being concentrated on Eastman Kodak minicard equipment. Both the Air Force and CIA expect to install minicard equipment as soon as it becomes available.

On behalf of the members of the agencies represented on the committee, CIA has entered into a contract with the

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in order to be kept currently informed of the latest developments in the field of information programs.

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Specific Recommendation C.10:**

"A heavy long-term investment should be made in the preparation of covert agents as eventual sources of high-level intelligence."

25X1C

NSC

- * General progress in the field of intelligence processing is also reported in Section C. 15 of the basic IAC report.
- ** Further discussion of other aspects of the clandestine collection program will be found in Section C. 17 of the basic IAC report.

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25X1C

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Specific Recommendation C.7:

"C. 6: The National Security Council establish policies and take actions which will permit the full exploitation of the intelligence and other advantages which can be made available to us through the establishment of stations on [redacted] 25X1C

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NSC

"C. 7: We should take steps to develop the special equipment and specialized personnel needed for intelligence operations in the region of [redacted] 25X1C

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Status: After extensive examination of this problem CIA has reached the conclusion that the implementation of these recommendations is principally an overt activity involving extensive logistical preparations and, therefore, more in keeping with the responsibilities and activities with the Department of Defense. A letter has been prepared to the Department of Defense requesting that they take the responsibility for pursuing these recommendations.

Specific Recommendation A.9:

"As a first step in comparing the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the United States and the USSR in a possible nuclear air war, a comprehensive comparison of U. S. and USSR Bravo, Romeo, and Delta target systems be undertaken in the context of a single symmetric study, using common terms of reference and a common frame-work of analysis."

103 - memo to NSC

Status: Principal responsibility in this recommendation rests with the Department of Defense. In support thereof CIA has continued to distribute its commodity and sector analyses of the Sino-Soviet Bloc economies to the Air Force for incorporation in whatever models AFOIN or its contractors develop.

NSC 5605, approved 24 May 1956, established procedures for providing integrated evaluations of the net capabilities of the USSR in the event of general war. More specifically, it states that while a general estimate should be made of the over-all effects of the U. S. attacks against the USSR, it is not expected or anticipated that detailed analyses will be undertaken. This directive supersedes NSC 5511 as [redacted]

NSC 5611, ILLEGIB

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The broad effectiveness of present nuclear weapons systems has appeared to make obsolete the construction of elaborate and detailed analyses of potentially hostile economies for purposes of post-attack damage assessment. Sufficiently accurate answers can be supplied far more easily by less elaborate means.

For these reasons, CIA proposes to take no further action.

Specific Recommendation C.6*

"There are generally recognized technical and administrative problems in the field of ELINT (electronic noise listening). This situation urgently needs attention. A combination of technical knowledge and adequate authority at a high level is required."

NSC

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Status: On 16 May 1955 the NSC noted the issuance of NSCID-17 which was approved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee for improvement of ELINT analysis. The National Technical Processing Center is now being activated with the full cooperation of CIA. It appears that ELINT cooperation and coordination will be effectively carried out.

* Further discussion of other aspects of the ELINT problem is contained in Section C.10.a. of the basic IAC report.

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